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BURYING MCCULLOCH? 
David S. Schwartz* 
Kurt Lash is a superb constitutional historian trapped inside 
the body of an originalist.  He is one of the few originalists bold 
enough to acknowledge that McCulloch v. Maryland1 needs to be 
ejected from the (conservative) originalist canon of great consti-
tutional cases.  While he attributes to me an intention “not to 
praise the mythological McCulloch, but to bury it,” it is Lash who 
seeks to bury McCulloch, which he views as a fraudulent “story 
of our constitutional origins.”2 
Characteristically, Lash’s debatable conclusions and inter-
pretations are accompanied by keen and erudite historical insight.  
The centerpiece of Lash’s post is an implicit debate between John 
Marshall and St. George Tucker, the William and Mary law pro-
fessor, judge, and author of the first major treatise on American 
constitutional law.  For Lash, Marshall channels the nationalist 
view of broadly construed national powers, whereas Tucker ad-
vocates “Tucker’s rule,” requiring that the Constitution “‘be con-
strued strictly, in all cases where the antecedent rights of a state 
may be drawn in question.’”3  
In McCulloch, of course, Marshall prefaces his analysis of 
implied powers with a brief rejection of “compact theory,” the 
view that the Constitution was, like the Articles of Confederation, 
essentially a treaty among sovereign states.4  Marshall instead em-
braces a “nationalist” vision of the Constitution’s essence in 
which the people of the United States, rather than the states, rati-
fied the Constitution, meeting in state conventions solely for 
* Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. Kurt Lash, McCulloch v. Madison: John Marshall’s Effort to Buy Madisonian Fed-
eralism, 73 ARK. L. REV. 119, 125 (2020). 
3. Id. at 123 (emphasis omitted).  For a more extended elaboration of Tucker’s notions
of federalism, see generally Kurt Lash, “Tucker’s Rule”: St. George Tucker and the Limited 
Construction of Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2006). 
4. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 402-03.
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convenience.5  As Marshall asked rhetorically, “[W]here else 
should they have assembled?”6 
Every Constitutional Law professor who teaches McCulloch 
explains this conflict between nationalist and compact theory, so 
that much is well known.  But Lash adds a new layer.  Marshall 
claims that he only mentions compact theory because Maryland’s 
counsel “deemed it of some importance.”7  Lash argues that Mar-
shall thereby “feigned ignorance” both of the true expositor of 
compact theory (Tucker), and of its true importance to the case.  
“Tucker’s rule” would presumably have required a robust appli-
cation of the Tenth Amendment by construing congressional 
powers narrowly in all cases where the states’ reserved powers 
“may be drawn in question”—that is to say, all cases of implied 
powers.8  “Tucker’s rule” was not therefore “of some im-
portance,” to the McCulloch decision, but of central importance: 
Tucker’s rule is the antithesis of “McCulloch’s rule” that implied 
powers should be broadly construed to promote the effective op-
eration of the national government. 
Lash convincingly argues that Marshall felt compelled to ad-
dress and reject Tucker’s rule in McCulloch and that Marshall 
used “Maryland’s counsel”9 as a stand-in for Tucker, who was an 
influential constitutional theorist.  Moreover, as Lash points out, 
Madison came around to views similar to Tucker’s by the time of 
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798.  When Marshall 
penned the McCulloch opinion in 1819, Lash astutely observes, 
“It would have been politically scandalous to directly criticize the 
work of James Madison and his influential 1800 Report on the 
Virginia Resolutions.”10  Lash provides no direct evidence of 
Marshall’s motivation to rebut Tucker beyond the fact that Mar-
shall and Tucker were “fellow Virginians.”11  But Lash’s infer-
ence has to be right.  Marshall had studied law at William and 
5. Id. at 403.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 402.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
9. Lash, supra note 2, at 124.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Mary with Tucker’s predecessor, the renowned George Wythe, 
and it would be a simple matter to show personal and professional 
connections between Marshall and Tucker in the small circle of 
Virginia political and legal elites.  As I show in my book, Mar-
shall was deeply concerned, if not obsessive, about answering the 
views of his Virginia opponents—hence his pseudonymous edi-
torials defending McCulloch in the spring of 1819.12  
Lash thus enriches our understanding of McCulloch and its 
context in intellectual history.  Lash shows that the Jeffersonian 
“strict necessity” test for implied powers had more substantial 
backing than that of Maryland’s counsel Luther Martin, the can-
tankerous old anti-federalist.  (The “strict necessity” test held that 
implied powers were limited to those without which the enumer-
ated power would be “nugatory.”)  Lash’s post can also shed new 
light on Gibbons v. Ogden,13 where Marshall again seemed to tan-
gle with an unnamed Tucker.  There, Marshall oddly changed his 
tune about the Constitution’s source, describing it, not as the 
product of the people themselves, but of the states—”these allied 
sovereigns [who] converted their league into a government.”14  
While more compatible with Tucker, this version of an origin 
story did not entail that the powers of Congress “ought to be con-
strued strictly.”15  Rather, Marshall argued, there was not “one 
sentence in the constitution which gives countenance to this 
rule.”16  Thanks to Lash, we can infer that “this rule” rejected by 
Marshall is Tucker’s rule. 
Lash is less convincing when he takes off his historian hat 
and puts on his originalist hat.  Lash chides me for being “never 
completely clear” on what I think is “the correct reading of the 
Constitution.”17  But I take it as praise, rather than criticism, that 
I did not reduce the ongoing 230-year conflict over federalism to 
a single “correct reading of the Constitution.”  I certainly believe 
that there is a “better” reading.  That the Constitution empowers 
12. DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND 
THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 62-67 (2019). 
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
14. Id. at 187
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Lash, supra note 2, at 119.
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the national government to address all national problems is both 
historically justifiable and normatively superior to its alternative.  
That alternative, “enumerationism,” is the Jefferson-Jackson-
Taney-Carter Coal-Morrison-NFIB view that we must on occa-
sion let national problems go unaddressed in order to demonstrate 
to ourselves that we are more committed to the ideology of lim-
ited enumerated national powers than we are to the preamble’s 
purposes of promoting justice and the general welfare of the na-
tion.18 
Lash insists that Tucker’s rule supplies the “correct” 
(originalist) reading of the Constitution, requiring that federal 
powers be narrowly construed whenever they touch on reserved 
state powers.  By rejecting Tucker’s rule and compact theory, 
Lash argues, Marshall tries to “reshape the story of our constitu-
tional origins”19 by turning it into a mythical, nationalist one.  But 
at this point, Lash offers a competing myth of his own.  He relies 
heavily on James Madison’s mythical reputation as “father of the 
Constitution” to claim that Madison’s belated, politically moti-
vated adoption of compact theory in the late 1790s is the true 
“original meaning” of the Constitution.  In doing so, Lash ignores 
Madison’s earlier views in the Framing and ratification periods, 
that the national government’s powers were not ceded by the 
states, but were instead derived directly from the people, who re-
distributed powers from the states to create a national government 
with supremacy over the states.  (Recall Madison’s cherished pro-
posal at the Philadelphia Convention for a national legislative 
veto over all state laws.20)  Lash’s constitutional origin story also 
asks us to ignore the views of George Washington, James Wilson, 
Gouverneur Morris, and indeed the dominant majority of the 1787 
Convention; the ratification debates over federal power, the Fed-
eralist party, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay and the national Repub-
licans—in short, one entire side of the debate over national pow-
ers that began with the founding and has been, in Marshall’s 
18. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, chs. 2, 5, 11, 13; David S. Schwartz, A Question
Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers, Capable Federalism, and the Limits of Enumeration-
ism, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 587-90 (2017). 
19. Lash, supra note 2, at 125.
20. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (1996). 
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words, “perpetually arising.”  To read Tucker’s rule as the sole 
“original” and therefore “correct” interpretation of the Constitu-
tion’s grant of powers to the national government is to read half 
of constitutional history out of history. 
Lash argues that my “almost single-minded focus on implied 
power” somehow feeds a particular “myth of McCulloch”—pre-
sumably the New Dealers’ sometime insistence that broad federal 
power was the correct original meaning of the Constitution.21  Of 
course, Tucker’s rule is also primarily, if not single-mindedly, fo-
cused on the theory of implied powers, which is indeed the cen-
terpiece of McCulloch.  But, importantly, McCulloch didn’t in-
vent the theory of implied powers, which was the subject of 
heated debate during ratification and was relied on heavily in the 
First Congress and in the debates over the First Bank of the United 
States.22  Marshall was not “reshaping” this aspect of the Consti-
tution’s origins, as Lash asserts, but merely recapitulating it. 
Historian Lash knows this, and it’s hard, even for Originalist 
Lash, to keep a good historian down.  Tucker’s rule, Lash admits, 
became “the dominant theory of the Constitution” only at “the 
election of 1800”—not at the founding.23  And Lash concedes that 
“One could, of course, argue that Madison and Tucker were spin-
ning myths when they described the Constitution as a dual-feder-
alist compact.”24  Yes, one could.  They were.  And originalists 
are spinning myths when they claim that there is a simple “origin 
story” of the Constitution that can compel a single “correct” read-
ing of the Constitution’s most contested elements. 
21. Lash, supra note 2, at 120; see, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 204-11.
22. See, e.g., John Mikhail, Fixing the Constitution’s Implied Powers, BALKINIZATION
(Oct. 25, 2018), [ https://perma.cc/9WS2-FD6V]; JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND 
CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 217 (2018); 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 25-26, 38-41. 
23. Lash, supra note 2, at 126.
24. Id. at 6.
